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Comment  Daniel McFadden
The rise of 401(k) plans as a channel for providing retirement incomes to 
employees makes enrollment in these plans increasingly important for the 
welfare of future retirees. The authors utilize persuasive natural experiments 
to quantify behavioral response to key 401(k) plan features: whether the 
default is automatic enrollment unless the employee opts out or nonenroll-
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ment unless the employee opts in, whether there is employer matching of 
contributions or an unconditional employer contribution, and the default 
contribution rate for enrollees. Classical theory of rational life cycle savings 
implies that response to tax- qualiﬁ  ed savings plans will depend critically on 
circumstances and intertemporal preferences (with matching or uncondi-
tional employer savings contributions inducing income and intertemporal 
substitution eﬀects), but rational consumers should display no partial or 
incomplete adjustment that leaves ﬁ  nal choices dependent on defaults. The 
authors’ ﬁ  ndings of signiﬁ  cant default eﬀects reinforces an extensive behav-
ioral literature that shows that consumers are inconsistent in their transac-
tions that trade certain consumption today for uncertain consumption in 
the future. These inconsistencies may be due to separate “mental accounts” 
for current and future consumption, diﬃculty in consistently evaluating 
risky prospects, time-  inconsistent hyperbolic discounting, or breakdowns 
in decision making due to lack of attention and procrastination.
Natural questions for social planners dealing with default-  sensitive con-
sumers is what aspects of savings instruments are signiﬁ  cant in inﬂ  uencing 
retirement savings behavior, and how defaults and other savings plan fea-
tures can be designed to minimize the regret that consumers have at retire-
ment when they review their past savings behavior. Note that inattention 
and incomplete optimization are bad for consumers who would otherwise 
be intertemporally consistent, but can be protective in circumstances where 
defaults avoid the excesses of faulty expectations and instant gratiﬁ  cation. 
The authors ﬁ  nd that employer matching of contributions to a 401(k) plan 
and unconditional employer 401(k) contributions both increase participa-
tion rates, but their eﬀect on participation is small relative to the eﬀect of 
opt- in versus opt- out. Then, adding or dropping matching or unconditional 
contributions to a 401(k) plan are not as critical as the opt-  in or opt-  out 
default. An additional question that would be interesting to answer if the 
authors’ data permitted would be whether total 401(k) savings from both 
employer and employee contributions, and total savings taking into account 
all consumer intertemporal transactions, including purchase and ﬁ  nancing 
of housing and other assets, increase as the result of employer matching or 
unconditional 401(k) contributions. Lack of consumer adjustment from 
defaults suggests that the answer would be aﬃrmative. Then, to the extent 
that people undersave for retirement, employer 401(k) matching or uncon-
ditional contributions will increase consumer welfare more than the same 
payment in current wages.
Rational Saving Behavior
At retirement, a large majority of consumers state that they regret that 
they did not save more. Also, consumption typically falls upon retirement, 
although whether this is inconsistent with rational life cycle planning de-
pends on the nature of preferences for goods versus leisure. These observa-Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 2 9
tions are consistent with a tacit assumption in the chapter that most consum-
ers do undersave. However, in deﬁ  ning the baseline against which various 
tax- qualiﬁ  ed savings plans and consumer responses are to be judged, it is 
worth reviewing what a textbook Fisherian analysis of savings says about 
participation in such plans, and their impact on total savings.
The instruments for intertemporal allocation available to consumers are 
purchase of consumer durables (e.g., home ownership) with secured (e.g., 
mortgage) ﬁ  nancing; credit card debt and other unsecured borrowing; and 
purchase of ﬁ  nancial assets through conventional and tax qualiﬁ  ed saving. 
Each channel for borrowing or saving carries its own rate of return (RoR), 
credit restrictions, and risk characteristics. Rational saving behavior is the 
result of optimal life cycle planning in the face of income endowments and 
the available instruments for intertemporal transactions. Then, rational sav-
ings will depend on current wealth and future income expectations, age and 
mortality expectations, family status (e.g., other wage earners, children), the 
available transaction instruments, and the applicable marginal RoR.
The Intertemporal Budget Set
Consider a simple model with a working period and a retirement period, 
each thirty years long, and consider annual consumption at the representa-
tive ages forty-  ﬁ  ve and seventy-  ﬁ  ve for work and retirement. Abstract from 
buﬀer stock and diversiﬁ  cation motives induced by risk, liquidity motives 
induced by transactions costs, and asset portfolio and consumption adjust-
ments in response to life event shocks within the working and retirement 
eras. This is a gross oversimpliﬁ  cation, but enough remains to clarify some 
key features of rational saving. Let Y0 and Y1 denote, respectively, endow-
ments of working income now and retirement income in the future. Retire-
ment consumption will be determined by Y1 and by voluntary saving and 
borrowing. Let t denote the marginal income tax rate, and assume for sim-
plicity that it is independent of income level or period, and that capital gains 
are taxed the same as ordinary income. Let home ownership during the 
working years represent the single available consumer durable. Let C0 and 
C1 denote, respectively, working period consumption and retirement period 
consumption net of housing services and taxes.
Assume that the rental rate on housing available to both workers and 
retirees is R. Assume that all retirees rent, and that workers either rent, or 
buy and occupy a house at purchase price H with a mortgage M. Owners 
amortize their mortgage over the working years, and sell when they retire. 
Assume that a minimum house price H∗ is required to provide the same 
services as a rental, and H   H∗ is a consumer durable investment. There 
are three other channels for intertemporal transactions: conventional sav-
ings (S), tax-  qualiﬁ  ed savings (Q) in a 401(k) plan, and unsecured borrow-
ing (B). Let rS, rM, and rB denote the respective annual interest rates on 
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denote the annual housing rate of capital gains less maintenance. Let ak  
rk/ [1  –   (1    rk)– 30] denote an annual payment over thirty years that has unit 
present value at interest rate rk. Note that one unit of an asset in period 0 that 
has an annual interest rate rk yields a future value (1   rk)30 in period 1, and 
the present value of a unit annual payment over 30 years at interest rate rk is 
pk   1/ a k. In the absence of risk or tax factors that induce an equity premium 
or discount, rent R in housing market equilibrium when landlords discount 
at the interest rate rS satisﬁ  es H∗   R/ a S   H∗(1   rH)30/ (1    rS)30.
Empirically, working consumers have high discount rates; to reﬂ  ect this, 
we assume that consumers discount at rate rB. This implies that consumers 
facing a market interest rate lower than rB will choose to consume more 
when working than when retired. For the two-  period representation of the 
consumer’s problem, assume that the initial equity H –   M in a house is 
annualized within period 0 to (H –   M)aB, and that the receipts (1   rH)30H 
from a house sale in period 1 are annualized within period 1 to (1   rH)30HaB. 
A mortgage M that is amortized over the span of period 0 has annual 
payments aMM, with 1 –  (1   rM)T– 30 giving the fraction of aMM that is mort-
gage interest in year T. The annualized value at the rate rB of the mortgage 
interest payments is aM[1 –  aB(1   rM)((1   rM)– 30 –  (1   rB)– 30)/ (rB –  rM)]M  
alM; this is a deduction from taxable income. Unsecured annual borrowing 
of aBB/ (1   rB)30 during the working period leads to a balance B repaid with 
annual payments aBB during retirement.
If a 401(k) plan has a unconditional employer contribution Q# and a 
matching rate  , then the employee with an annual contribution Q in the 
working period receives an annual taxable return of (Q#   Q(1    ))(1   rS)30 
in the retirement period. Credit constraints are an income-  determined 
bound (B   yY0) on unsecured borrowing, income and house value bounds 
(M    Y0 and M    H) on a mortgage, and a cap (Q   Q∗) on tax- qualiﬁ  ed 
savings. The case that a 401(k) plan is not available will correspond to Q#   
Q∗   0. This notation is summarized in table 11C.1.
Let D denote a discrete variable that is one if the consumer buys a house, 
and zero if she rents. Taking into account the rules that the 401(k) contri-
bution and mortgage interest expense are deductible from taxable income 
in period 0, and all 401(k) saving is taxed when withdrawn, representative 
working period and retirement period annual consumption satisfy
 C 0   Y0   t(Y0   Q)   BaB/ (1    rB)30   S   Q 
    (1   D)R   D(aMM   aB(H   M)   talM),
 C 1   (1   t)(Y1   (1   rS)30S   (1   rS)30(Q#   Q(1    ))) 
    tS   R   aBB   DaBH((1   t)(1   rH)30   t).
A home purchaser will beneﬁ  t from obtaining the maximum possible mort-
gage ifImpact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 3 1
 C0/   M   aB   tal   aM   0.
For example, at tax rate t   0.3 and real annual interest rates rB   0.10 and 
rM   0.05, one has aB   0.106, aM   0.065, al   0.034, and  C0/   M   0.051. 
The after-  tax RoR for the intertemporal transaction instrument S is RoRS   
– ( C1/   S)/ ( C0/   S)   (1 –   t)(1   rS)30   t. Similarly, the after-  tax RoR for 
B and Q are, respectively, RoRB   (1   rB)30 and RoRQ   (1    )(1   rS)30. 
The present value of postponing taxes implies RoRQ   RoRS. Continuing 
the numerical example with     1 gives RoRB   17.45, RoRQ   4.85 when 
    1 and RoRQ   2.43 when     0, and RoRS   2.00. The housing after- tax 
RoR for H   H∗ with a maximum mortgage unconstrained by income is 
RoRH   aB[t   (1 –  t)(1   rH)30]/ [ aM   (1 –   )aB –   tal]. When the mortgage 
is constrained by income (H    Y0/    and M    Y0), the housing RoR is 
RoRH0   t (1 –   t)(1   rH)30. In the example, when rH   0.02 and     0.7, 
the RoR are RoRH   2.88 and RoRH0   1.57. The ranking of RoRH rela-
tive to RoRQ and RoRS is quite sensitive to the tax rate, the expected rate of 
capital gains less maintenance for housing, and  . Note that unconditional 
employer contributions Q# to a 401(k) plan are equivalent to a shift in retire-
ment income.
Because the various instruments for saving or borrowing have diﬀerent 
RoR and restrictions, these equations in each of the two conditions D   
0 and D   1 deﬁ  ne a convex budget set with piecewise linear boundaries. 
The overall budget set is then the possibly nonconvex union of these two 
conditional budget sets. The rational consumer will seek the eﬃcient bound-
ary of the overall budget set, and will always save at the highest available 
post-  tax RoR and borrow at the lowest available post-  tax RoR. When the 
best available borrowing RoR exceeds the best available saving RoR, the 
rational consumer will gain by reducing borrowing and saving dollar for 
dollar until one is zero. This gives the Fisherian exclusionary rule that a 
rational consumer will never a borrower and lender be, except possibly for 
investment channels like housing that lever the purchase with mortgage 
borrowing, and give the combination favorable tax treatment. The optimal 
intertemporal allocation for the rational consumer will be at a node, or on 
a line segment between nodes at which only one intertemporal channel is 
not constrained at a boundary. Thus, consumers who maximize utility with 
Table 11C.1  Channels for intertemporal transactions
Channel   Quantity   Interest rate   Credit constraint
Conventional saving Sr S none
House purchase Hr H H   H∗
Mortgage Mr M M   min{ H,  Y0}
Revolving credit Br B B    Y0
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positive unsecured borrowing will have zero conventional saving, and will 
not respond to incremental new 401(k) savings channels whose RoR is lower 
than their eﬀective RoR on debt. It is more eﬃcient for them to pay down 
debt if an incremental change in tastes or income endowment leads them to 
want to postpone some consumption. Consumers who have positive con-
ventional savings at their utility maximum will enroll in a 401(k) plan when 
it becomes available, and this portfolio shift will reduce conventional sav-
ing. It is also possible that consumers who have invested in owner-  occupied 
housing beyond the level necessary for basic housing services will enroll in a 
401(k) plan when it becomes available, and reduce their housing investment. 
Whether these oﬀsets are partial or complete will depend on income and 
substitution eﬀects. Only consumers at a node in the budget set where they 
are neither borrowers nor savers will have unambiguously higher savings 
after introduction of a 401(k) channel. In no case will the opt-  in or opt-  out 
default on a 401(k) plan inﬂ  uence the rational consumer’s ﬁ  nal position.
The clear-  cut implications from the Fisherian exclusionary rule will be 
relaxed in reality when some instruments are used for liquidity to reduce 
transactions costs, and/  or when instruments are risky and the beneﬁ  ts of 
diversiﬁ  cation oﬀset loss in expected return. However, it is diﬃcult to avoid 
the implication that in general it is rational for borrowers facing high mar-
ginal RoR to pay down debt rather than carry both debt and voluntary 401(k) 
contributions. Then, 401(k) defaults that induce high participation rates 
may misdirect consumers who should instead be reducing debt, although 
the consumer who irrationally undersaves and does not oﬀset induced tax-
  deferred saving with increased debt may beneﬁ  t from the precommitment 
and be better oﬀ than with no savings at all.
Rational Intertemporal Optimization
For further discussion within the simple Fisherian framework of savings 
behavior, and the income and substitution eﬀects induced by 401(k) plans, it 
is useful to represent the budget set graphically. Figure 11C.1 illustrates the 
overall budget set for typical values.1 The budget set for renters is the area 
southwest of the line segments through a, b, c, d. Node c corresponds to no 
tax- qualiﬁ  ed or conventional savings and no borrowing. The segment c-  d 
corresponds to unsecured borrowing to the maximum at d. The segment 
b- c corresponds to 401(k) contributions to a maximum at b, and the segment 
a-  b corresponds to conventional saving. The budget set for owners is the 
area southwest of the line segments through e, f, g, h, i. Node h corresponds 
to a minimum house purchase with a maximum mortgage, and no other 
saving or borrowing. The segment h-  i corresponds to unsecured borrowing 
1. Numerical values are Y0   150, Y1   50, H∗   200, Q#   4, Q∗   4, t   0.3,     2,     
0.7,     1, and     1. The interest rates are rB   0.1, rM   0.05, rS   0.03, and rH   0.02.Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 3 3
to a maximum at i. The segment g-  h corresponds to 401(k) contributions 
to a maximum at g. The segment f-  g corresponds to a consumer durable 
investment in housing, with maximum mortgage ﬁ  nancing, to a maximum 
at f where the income constraint on a mortgage binds. The segment e-  f 
corresponds to conventional saving. The union of the renter and owner 
budget sets is not convex—linear combinations of b and h are not attainable. 
Note that nodes a and i are interior to the budget set, as are various points 
reached by combinations of borrowing or saving at less than the best avail-
able RoR.
A population of consumers with varying rates of impatience will maxi-
mize preferences among the exposed nodes and line segments of the given 
overall budget set. The more impatient rent, and the more patient own. (Het-
erogeneity in wealth and the intertemporal distribution of income endow-
ments will induce heterogeneity in overall budget sets, and this will also 
contribute to heterogeneity in optimal choices.) In the example in the ﬁ  gures, 
consumers who optimize as renters at the node c or on the segment c-  d, or 
optimize as owners at h or on the exposed part of the line segment h-  i, will 
not contribute voluntarily to a 401(k) plan. Note that these conclusions are 
quite sensitive to the relative position of the node h and the line segment a- b; 
increases in the 401(k) employer match rate or a higher contribution ceiling 
Q∗, or an increase in rS, may shift h to the southwest of the a-  b segment so 
that it is no longer eﬃcient to be a homeowner without savings.
Now consider the impact of changes in features of the 401(k) plan. First, 
rational consumers treat an increase in an unconditional employer contribu-
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tion to a 401(k) plan as a component of retirement income, with no substitu-
tion eﬀect on discretionary saving. In the usual case that current and future 
consumption are both normal goods, the income eﬀect of an increased 
401(k) unconditional contribution will reduce period 0 voluntary savings, 
but increase total savings and period 1 consumption. Second, increasing 
the employer match rate on voluntary 401(k) contributions increases RoRQ, 
or the slopes of the a-  h and b-  c segments in the ﬁ  gures. The substitution 
eﬀect will increase contribution rates of consumers whose optima are on the 
g-  h or b-  c line segments, and may induce participation of some consumers 
located at the nodes h and b. The income eﬀect in the normal goods case 
will oﬀset some of the increased savings induced by the substitution eﬀect. 
If the increase in the matching rate moves the budget sets around in a way 
that makes some nodes without 401(k) contributions ineﬃcient, there could 
be a nonmarginal 401(k) participation response to a marginal increase in 
the matching rate.
The nature of heterogeneity of tastes and endowments among rational 
consumers, as well as tax rates and RoR, will determine the overall popu-
lation impact of changes in 401(k) features. The example in the ﬁ  gures does 
not necessarily describe the dominant eﬀect. However, the example serves 
to illustrate the point that universal participation in 401(k) plans, even with 
signiﬁ  cant matching, is not necessarily rational, and that the overall impact 
of 401(k) plan parameters must be assessed in terms of overall life cycle 
consequences. The important next step after showing that consumers adjust 
only partially from defaults is to establish that it is second-  best welfare-
  maximizing to select defaults that increase participation. Even if this step 
is true for most, it is a signiﬁ  cant research problem to deﬁ  ne welfare when 
consumer behavior does not reveal consistent preferences, to determine 
who the winners are when a policy changes defaults, and to determine how 
defaults should be targeted to consumer segments to approximate a second-
  best welfare maximum.
Conclusions
I conclude with some observations on sources and consequences of be-
havioral inconsistencies, their impact on “happiness” broadly deﬁ  ned, and 
the ease with which these errors can be controlled to increase consumer 
welfare through defaults, framing, and education. There seem to be two 
major categories of deviations from life cycle rationality. First, there are 
errors that arise from lack of attention, procrastination, faulty perceptions, 
and careless optimization. These are “mechanical” errors in preference 
maximization that may either be overcome through consumer education, 
or ﬁ  nessed through framing and defaults. The consumer may be aware of 
these shortcomings in her decision process, and recognize that defaults, pre-
commitments, or other interventions facilitate her decisions and increase 
her happiness. In the case of 401(k) choices, the use of enrollment windows, Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 3 5
penalties for delay, and rewards for immediate response may focus attention 
and discourage procrastination. Consumers are also more likely to attend to 
employer unconditional contributions or matching if they are marketed as 
attention- getting “bargains” for the consumer, or framed to deﬂ  ect attention 
from current cost.
Second, there are errors that arise from mistakes in anticipating the con-
sumer’s own tastes, particularly time-  inconsistent impatience, asymmetric 
loss aversion, and genuine instabilities in tastes, including phenomena such 
as physical or emotional health-  linked tastes that cannot be anticipated 
from the consumer’s current state. Here, intervention is more diﬃcult, both 
because the consumer may resist changes that appear to reduce current util-
ity, and because in the absence of stable preferences it is diﬃcult to make 
unambiguous judgments about consumer welfare. Further, interventions to 
encourage saving have to counter the active, sharp marketing practices of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions that proﬁ  t from exploiting consumers’ intertemporal 
irrationality and drive for instant gratiﬁ  cation through overselling of credit 
cards, subprime mortgages, and equity loans. Laboratory lottery experi-
ments in which both the utility and the probability of payoﬀs are ambiguous 
seem to oﬀer the best possibility of testing consumer acceptance of informa-
tion or procedures that reduce ambiguity, encourage strategic planning, or 
build resistence to marketing appeals for instant gratiﬁ  cation.
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